This website uses cookies

Read our Privacy policy and Terms of use for more information.

In December 1975, a 24-year-old engineer at Kodak named Steve Sasson finished building something strange. It was the size of a toaster, weighed eight pounds, and shot black-and-white images at a resolution of 100 by 100 pixels. Each photo took 23 seconds to record onto a cassette tape.

It was the world's first portable digital camera. No film anywhere in the process. Just electronics, capturing a picture.

The next year, Sasson demoed it for Kodak executives. He'd walk into the room, take pictures of the people in it, pop the tape into a playback unit, and watch their faces appear on a TV screen. Nobody asked him how it worked. What they asked was why anyone would want to take a picture this way when there was nothing wrong with conventional photography.

The reaction he remembers best was, "That's cute. But don't tell anyone about it."

The Part Everyone Gets Wrong

The story usually gets told as if Kodak was blind to the merits of the invention. They weren't. That's why we’re still talking about it.

Kodak patented Sasson's camera in 1978, and that patent family would eventually earn them billions in licensing. Their labs kept pushing the technology forward, and by 1986 they'd built a record-setting 1.4-megapixel sensor. In 1989, Sasson and a colleague built the first modern DSLR, a genuinely sellable digital camera.

Kodak declined to sell it. Not because they doubted it would work, but because it would work too well. Every digital camera sold was a customer who stopped buying film, and film was the business. Kodak wasn't just selling cameras, it was selling the razor-and-blades model of the century: cheap cameras, then decades of film, developing, and paper. Digital photography threatened the entire structure of the company.

So at every fork over thirty years, Kodak looked at the future its own engineers kept inventing and chose the present instead. The executives weren't fools. Each individual decision was defensible. Film was wildly profitable this quarter, and digital wasn't ready yet. The problem is that "not yet" got decided the same way, every year, until it was too late.

The Slow-Motion Ending

The ending has a bitter symmetry to it. When digital finally swallowed photography, Kodak did try. They even became a top seller of digital cameras in the early 2000s. But digital margins never came close to film margins, and the company had spent its decades of lead time defending the old model instead of learning to win in the new one.

In January 2012, Kodak filed for bankruptcy. Among the assets it tried to sell were the digital imaging patents its own people had pioneered, including the descendants of a toaster-sized box from 1975.

Kodak didn't get disrupted by a competitor that saw something they couldn't. They got disrupted by their own invention, which they saw first, patented first, and understood better than anyone on Earth. The company had every answer except the one that required hurting its own numbers to survive.

That's the real lesson, and it applies to more than film companies. The hard part of the future is almost never seeing it coming. It's accepting what it costs in the present.

A FREE TOOL FOR YOU

Don’t let your career fall behind

A free 16-page field guide that diagnoses your promotion bottleneck, shows what it's costing you, and helps you fix it.

That’s all for now!

Got a second? Give some feedback on today’s article so we can keep making improvements to The Manifold.

Keep building,
Max

PS — Sasson eventually got the National Medal of Technology from the President for the camera Kodak told him to keep quiet about.